

KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC

This part of the book deals with the conditions under which judgments can express truths about objects. Here Kant tries to explain how thought about objects given in space and time is possible. (It is unlike general logic, which deals with thoughts related to one another.) Just as space and time provide the structure for perceiving, logic provides the structure for thinking. Logic provides us with all the forms of possible judgments.

The book is divided into two parts. In the Transcendental Analytic deals with legitimate uses of concepts, while the Transcendental Dialectic deals with illegitimate attempts to extend knowledge beyond experience.

THE TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC

PURPOSE

“Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind.... The understanding cannot intuit anything, and the senses cannot think anything. Only from their union can cognition arise. Hence we distinguish the science of the rules of sensibility as such, i.e., aesthetics, from the science of the rules of the understanding, as such, i.e., logic.” (p. 654)

Unlike sensibility, which passively receives its objects (viz. intuitions), the understanding spontaneously generates its objects (viz. concepts).

The concepts of cause, self, and substance for example, are not given in intuition. There is no impression corresponding to them. The mind creates them. In this respect Hume was right. But Hume concludes that they are a fantasy.

Note: Unlike concepts like table and tree, the concepts of cause, self, etc., are referred to as *pure concepts of the understanding* because, as Hume has shown, they are not results of generalizations from intuition.

Kant wants to show instead that they are necessary for human knowledge.

He needs to show that although they are subjective conditions of thought, they have objective validity. Or, to express it differently, Kant needs to show how they relate to any experience in spite of the fact that they do not come from experience.

The Transcendental Deduction is just a way of explaining this. It explains how the gap between subjectivity and objectivity can be filled. The Deduction explains why it is right for us to employ the subjective concepts when they don't come from any experience.

A FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTION

A fundamental assumption Kant makes here is that to know is to judge. Concepts get their meaning from the role they play in judgment, and judgment is irreducible. The cognizing mind is essentially a judging mind.

“... the only use that the understanding can make of these concepts is to judge by means of them....” And “... since all acts of the understanding can be reduced to judgments, the understanding as such can be represented as a faculty of judgment.” (p. 655)

This thesis is quite similar to Wittgenstein's, that meaning is determined by use. If, for example, you lack the grammar of “If S then P,” you can make no use of causality. Cf. Wittgenstein's claim that “[The limits of language are the limits of my world.](#)”

Kant states that “though all our knowledge begins in experience, it by no means follows that it arises out of experience.” Transcendental knowledge is not of experience itself, but it cannot be true without experience.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC

The *Analytic* is subdivided into (i) *The Analytic of Concepts* and (ii) *The Analytic of Principles*.

In the *Analytic of Concepts* Kant tries to show which pure concepts the understanding generates, and what right it has to employ them to objects.

In the *Analytic of Principles* he tries to show how specific principles associated with the pure understanding are justified.

THE ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTS

**The Guide for (Clue to) the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of
the Understanding (i.e. *The Metaphysical Deduction*):**

Kant argues that there must be an apprehension of unity in experience. But this can never come through the senses. So there must be at least one a priori concept, viz., unity, a synthetic unity.

In this section he tries to provide a clue to explaining which concepts supply the conceptual conditions of human knowledge. He is going from formal logic to concepts with content.

Following Aristotle, and this is partly why it is only a clue, since he doesn't justify Aristotle's list, he says there are 12 functions of unity in judgments. Their content can derive only from their role in pure intuition.

Judgments of Quantity:

Universal (“All S is P” e.g., “All whales are mammals.”)

Particular (“Some S is P” e.g., “Some whales are females.”)

Singular (“x is P” e.g., “Socrates is wise.”)

Judgments of Quality:

Affirmative (“S is P” e.g., “Bill is moral.”)

Negative (“S is not P” e.g., “Bill is not moral.”)

Infinite (“S is non-P” e.g., “Bill is amoral.”)

Judgments of Relations:

Categorical (“S is P.”)

Hypothetical (“If S is P then S is Q.”)

Disjunctive (“S is P or Q.”)

Judgments of Modality:

Problematic (“S might be P.”)

Assertoric (“S is P.”)

Apodictic (“S must be P.”)

Corresponding to each type of judgment is a category. The Table of the Categories lists them as follows:

Unity, plurality, and totality are categories of quantity.

Reality, negation, and limitation are categories of quality.

Inherence and subsistence, causality and dependence, and reciprocity are categories of relation.

Possibility and impossibility, existence and non-existence, necessity and contingency are categories of modality.

On the weak interpretation of the Analytic, he thinks these are categories we do have; on the strong interpretation he thinks they are ones we must have.

The categories are a priori concepts that apply not to objects in general, but objects of intuition in general, intuitions being the only objects of possible experience (A96)

Though not derived from experience, the categories must apply to experience (A86/B119).

Example: We apply the categories in the logical form of the judgment “x is P” (which is singular, affirmative, categorical, and assertoric) to the intuition to get “This is a face.”

Kant’s claim is that to get from subjectivity to objectivity there must be categories.

The Metaphysical Deduction:

Kant's Formulation:

“The same function that gives unity to the various representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition. This unity—speaking generally—is called the pure concept of the understanding. Hence the same understanding—and indeed through the same acts whereby it brought about, in concepts, the logical form of judgment by means of analytic unity—also brings into its representations a transcendental content, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition as such; and because of this, these representations are called pure concepts of the understanding which apply to objects a priori—something that general logic cannot accomplish.” (p. 657)

Example:

The Judgment: “This is a face.”

The Form of Judgment: “x is P.”

For Kant, the categories are the mechanisms through which we go from the mark to the face. I see the mark as a face.

Note: Kant isn't a direct realist. (A direct realist claims to see the world as it is directly.) He is also not an indirect realist. (He doesn't think that he infers the world from his sense-data.) Finally, he isn't an idealist. He doesn't think ideas get their reality from other ideas. Rather, he is a representationalist.

But what he hasn't shown yet is that his view isn't just a form of conventionalism (viz., that convention generates linguistic meaning). He needs to show that some categories are necessary a priori.

The form of judgment provides the form (i.e. the syntax) and the intuition provides the matter (i.e. the semantics).

But this (viz. the metaphysical deduction) only provides a clue because he assumes Aristotle's categories. In the Transcendental Deduction he will show only that there must be some categories. Then, in the Analogies of Experience, he defends the categories we need.

Why are the categories necessary? Because we have no other way of putting the concepts together to get knowledge of the world than via the logical forms.

The Deductions of the Pure Concepts of Understanding (i.e. *The Transcendental Deduction*):

In this section Kant shows that these categories have justified application to what we intuit. The Transcendental Unity of Apperception is the fundamental condition of cognition.

The A-Deduction: NKS, A95-A114; Not in Ariew.

The B-Deduction: NKS, B130-B169; Ariew, pp. 662-672.

The Problem: NKS, 104: The complex idea of an object is the totality of ideas about it (e.g., the redness, the squareness, the hardness, etc.). But besides these they also contain the confused idea of something to which they all belong. (It is a red square.) A substance is a body having all these qualities. But it is *something* having all of these qualities. It is something = x besides, but I know not what. What provides the unity?

The Problem from a Temporal Perspective: There is an auditory 'bob' impression followed by an auditory 'white' impression, but how do they get linked up as impressions of the same object?

Two Interpretations of the A-Deduction:

The Progressive Interpretation: Kant's ambition here is anti-skeptical. He wants to deduce from his self-awareness that he must be aware of himself as having objective knowledge.

The Regressive Interpretation: Kant assumes that we have knowledge of the world. He only wants to show the legitimacy of the categories.

The Copernican Turn (A105):

The X relating subject and object is nothing to us because we can only deal with our representations. Hence, the object can be nothing but the formal unity of consciousness (i.e., the logical functions of judgment). 'Relation to an object' is the unification of the manifold in accordance with *a priori* rules. The *a priori* rules give us the concept of an object. So the ground of world order is in the subject, not the object!

This is the Transcendental Unity of Apperception. Our relation to the world comes through our activities of unification, and this we find in the forms of judgment.

“But it is clear that, since we have to deal only with the manifold of our representations, and since that x (the object) which corresponds to them is nothing to us—being, as it is, something that has to be distinct from all our representations—the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations. It is only when we have thus produced synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition that we are in a position to say that we know the object. But this unity is impossible if the intuition cannot be generated in accordance with a rule by means of such a function of synthesis, as it makes the reproduction of the manifold a priori necessary, and renders possible a concept in which it is united.”

The First Edition Deduction: The three fold synthesis in the understanding (A97-A104):

1. *Apprehension in intuition:* The act of running through and gathering together of what is in intuition.
2. *Reproduction in imagination:* The role of imagination in reproducing past representations to construct something more than mere fragmentary thoughts or images (A102). When the ‘white’ impression occurs the ‘bob’ impression is reproduced. This might be all that happens if we were suffering from extreme “amnesia,” but then no thought would be produced and no knowledge obtained.
3. *Recognition in a concept:* This involves recognizing present thought to be the same as, and continuous with, the immediately past thought (A103): the notion of a ‘concept’ as a grasping, or gathering together.

2 Cases:

Case 1: Suppose I have an impression of seeing (apprehending) a black blob and an impression of hearing (apprehending) “caw”. Spontaneously the impressions are unified and an act of recognition occurs—“Ah, a crow.” But the two impressions weren’t one impression. They were unified. (Compare this case with the case where one person has an impression of seeing a black blob and another has the impression of hearing “caw”.)

Case 2: Suppose I have an impression of hearing “bob,” and then an impression of hearing “white”. When the impression of “white” occurs “bob” gets reproduced and they are unified in the recognition of a bob-white. (Compare this case with the case where one person has an impression of hearing “bob” and then another has an impression of hearing “white”.)

In both of these cases—and this is the Copernican Turn—something else also happened; a “self-awareness” occurred. In the former case the same self that saw a black blob heard “caw”; while in the latter case, the same self that heard “bob,” when it heard “white” reproduced “bob” and recognized a bob-white. This is what Hume missed!

The next step in the argument involves pointing out that recognizing involves synthesizing in a judgment.

We are now in a position to formulate the argument:

Premise 1: The Unity Premise: All representations of which I am aware have a unity of apperception.

Premise 2: The Synthesis Premise: Representations can have such unity (i.e. can be recognized) only if synthesized in a judgment.

Premise 3: The Category Premise: Syntheses in judgments requires categories.

Conclusion: Categories apply to all representations of which I am aware.

Kant says that “Only in so far as I can unite a manifold of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible for me to represent to myself the identity of the consciousness in these representations.” (B133; p. 663 in Ariew)

Note: He is not saying here that in every judgment I make I must be able to ascribe that judgment to myself. The awareness of self is not something over and above the judgment.

The self-awareness isn't isolatable from the judgment made. Just being aware of something as a crow or a bob-white is already being self-aware.

However, he is saying that this is the only time self-awareness occurs. His view is not Descartes'. The self isn't a thing. It is a function, a doing. The self is not isolatable from the judgments made.

Later, in the *Transcendental Dialectic*, where Kant discusses the problem of dialectic illusions, in the chapter on *Paralogisms*, which deals with the illusions that concern the self, he will argue that neither the Transcendental Unity of Apperception nor what we might call apperceptive self-awareness, tell us anything about the mind and the self's true structure. For Kant, function does not determine substance.

The Second Edition Deduction:

Consider the experience of listening to a piece of music. Only if there is a unity of the self across time, can I experience the music. I can experience the music. Therefore, there is a unity of the self across time. But I can experience the music only if I can put the notes together in a unified system. The connection must be by means of categories. Therefore the categories are necessary and objective.

The Argument:

Representationalist Background (An Analysis of Discursive Cognition):

Premise 1: All cognition occurs via the mind's immediate awareness of its own internal representational states.

The alternatives are to be (i) a direct realist, or (ii) an indirect realist, or (iii) an idealist.

Premise 2: These representations are not intrinsically available to the subject's awareness; that is, unconscious representations are logically possible.

Here Kant agrees with Leibniz that unconscious representations (petite perceptions) can occur. But they are not cognition. To be able to make judgments we need to be aware of the representations—we must apperceive them. I.e., the 'I think' must be able to accompany all my representations for there to be a cognitive claim.

Conclusion 1: Therefore, cognition must involve a special reflexive act of bringing representations to awareness—that is, it must involve the apperception of representations. (*From 1 and 2*)

Premise 3: A discursive mind is a mind that is receptive in cognition to an independent reality. (*Definition of 'discursive': A discursive mind can be contrasted with a mind that creates its own reality.*)

Note: On this interpretation Kant is not trying to argue against skepticism. He takes it that what we need to do is cognize an independently existing reality, not create it. He isn't an idealist. He is a representationalist. Also, he is maintaining that we begin holistically. There is no lower level of cognition beneath judgment.

Conclusion 2: Therefore, in cognition the discursive mind apperceives its own internal states as presenting an independent objective world to itself. (*From Conclusion 1 and Premise 3.*)

I.e., what an apperceptive mind apperceives are its own internal states as representing an independent world.

Premise 4: That is to say that discursive cognition is the apperception of sensible intuitions. (From Conclusion 2 and the definition of 'sensible intuition'—as a determination of the faculty of receptivity (or sensibility) which the subject grasps as presenting an object.)

Since an independent world is a world capable of being sensed, all discursive cognition is apperception of sensible intuitions—that is things in space and time.

Premise 5: All objects of sensible intuitions are represented as complex.

There is an Implicit assumption here--certainly valid in the case of human cognition--that in representing objects in space and/or time one thereby represents them as complex. We never have an awareness of something absolutely simple.

Conclusion 3: Therefore, discursive cognition is the apperception of unified complex representations. (From 6 and 7)

The Master Argument (#16):

To apperceive unified complex representations is to apperceive all of the component representations as hanging together in a unity. (The 'principle of the necessary unity of apperception'--an analytic truth.)

EXAM 3 STUDY QUESTIONS:

1. Discuss Kant's Aesthetics.
2. Discuss Kant's Metaphysical Deduction (i.e., Chapter I of the *Analytic*, pp. 653-658).